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Warfare and Welcome
Practicality and Qur’ānic Hierarchy in Ibāḍī Muslims’ 
Jurisprudential Rulings on Music
Bradford J. Garvey
And the instruments of entertainment that have no use
Outside of themselves are to be broken whenever they are found,
In all of their types that exist,
Because in this there is no benefit.
—‘Abdullah bin Ḥumayd “Nūr al-Dīn” al-Sālimī (1286–1332/1869–1914) in the Jawhār al-Niẓām
Omani Orientations to the 
Charge of “Music”
A few days before Ramadan began in 
2016, I was sitting in my friend Ḥamad’s 
majlis, a large sitting room adjacent to his 
home, enjoying a ḥilba, a milky, fenugreek-
flavored drink. Over the course of the last 
year or so, I had interviewed Ḥamad dozens 
of times in his role as the manager of a local 
men’s performance group that specialized 
in the performance of a choral ode called 
al-‘āzī and a war dance, al-razḥa. Though 
my research was focused on the highly 
charged exchange of praise poetry and 
governmentally directed dispensation, I had 
slowly come to realize the delicacy of the 
religious toleration of these public praise 
genres in Oman. The ‘āzī and the razḥa were, 
in the eyes of most, expressions of Omani 
pride, masculine solidarity, and communal 
obligation. But that did not mean they were 
not Islamically suspect, even here, in the 
small, rural town of Manah in the Interior 
region of the Sultanate of Oman. 
Nestled in the southeast corner of the 
Arabian Peninsula and boasting some three 
million citizen-residents, the sultanate and 
its various historical polities have remained 
one of the few bastions of ’Ibādiyya, or 
Ibādism, the third major branch of Islam. 
Though no official population count exists, 
the Interior province of the modern sultanate, 
along with adjacent regions, was until the 
1950s part of one of the longest-lasting 
theocratic regimes in the world, called the 
Ibāḍī Imamate. Overthrown by the current 
sultan’s father in the late 1950s (despite 
himself and all his line being nominally 
Ibāḍī), the Imamate has cast a long shadow 
over Oman’s historiography. I found myself 
darting in and out of that long shadow 
in interviews, poetry discussions, and 
conversations with performers throughout 
my year of researching men’s performance.
The tension around engaging in a 
variety of performance genres—drumming, 
dancing, singing—was palpable during my 
research in many ways. Early on, I realized 
that a direct approach to the music question 
got me nowhere. In fact, framing my 
research as studying “music” was met only 
by furtive glances and unsure responses. Yes, 
I was assured, there was “music” in Oman, 
surely; Bedouins or “mountain folks” (‘and 
al-jabāl) play “music,” that’s probably what 
I meant. I quickly found out that the key 
term was not music, or mūsīqā, but funūn—
the “arts.” The performance genres I studied 
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were properly “arts,” not music. The reason 
for this tentative response was, of course, 
that Ibāḍīs had quite a dim view of “music.” 
And yet, there I was, months into research 
on a practice that was but was not musical.
And so we return to that day in Hamad’s 
majlis, seated with our backs to the short, 
threadbare couch that lined all four walls; 
the beige, satiny gloss of the new paint 
glinting in the strong fluorescent lighting; 
the walls boasting hand-painted sūra-s of 
the Qur’ān hanging amid floating palm trees 
painted in permanent bloom. I was setting 
out my notebook and recorder when Ḥamad 
noticed a book on the status of music in 
Islam sticking out of my bag. 
“Oh, father,” he moaned, “what is this?” 
“This?” I picked up the book. “This is a 
book about Islamic jurisprudence . . . .”
“Well, I can see that, doctor. What do 
you want with it [shtibā bih]?”
“I just wanted to know the opinions of 
Ibāḍī scholars on music . . . .”
“That’s fine,” Ḥamad said, leaning back 
and pulling his long white dishdāsha robe 
over his feet, “but you’re not studying 
‘music’ [mūsīqā]. If you want to know about 
that, it’s not in razḥa. There’s no melody, 
there’s no singing, there’s no instruments 
[mā shay al-naghmāt, mā shay al-ghinā’, mā 
shay al-ma‘āzif]. But I’m no scholar, don’t 
ask me. I don’t know. Listen, I don’t want 
to enter into that issue, I don’t even want 
to enter into it [mū bāghī adakhkhalu]. The 
razḥa is for warfare and welcome [al-ḥarb 
wa-l-tarḥīb], that’s what I say to any imam.”
“That reminds me, why isn’t the razḥa 
ever performed if a new mosque is opened?” 
I asked facetiously, trying to corner him. I 
had been studying the role of razḥa and 
‘āzī in civil celebrations of governmental 
generosity, and so the conspicuous absence 
of praise poetry to celebrate the opening of 
the hundreds of smaller mosques and the 
dozens of huge jāmi‘ (one in each town, 
all confusingly named the “Sultan Qaboos 
Grand Mosque”) was very obvious to me 
but brooked no comment from performers.
“Oh, lord spread blessings and mercy like 
rain. That is a good question for the Islamic 
scholars. I do not know.”
Months earlier, I was discussing some 
of the local arts that were less well known 
than the razḥa and the ‘āzī with Khamīs, 
the leader of a new troupe in the town of 
’Izkī. We were meeting in his ‘azba, a kind of 
semipermanent camp and corral for grazing 
stock, eating dates by the goat pen that he 
affectionately referred to as the “UN” (“I’ve 
got every type of goat in there,” he boasted, 
“Indian, Pakistani, Sindhi, Afghan, Somali, 
Kenyan, Nubian, Egyptian, Georgian, 
Bosnian, Iraqi, Persian, Balochi, Roman, and 
Chinese—it’s the UN of goats [al-’umum al-
mutaḥḥida māl al-hūsh]”). After a half-hour 
of chatting, a pickup full of Khamīs’s male 
kin pulled up. We exchanged pleasantries 
and they joined us in eating dates.
“We’re talking about music [mūsīqā],” 
Khamīs said casually, flicking his eyes over 
to his younger brother.
“The arts?” his brother replied.
“No, music,” he insisted., “This 
Englishman wants to study music here.”
“Well, not music, God lengthen your 
lives,” I jumped in. “I want to study the 
arts. But we were chatting a bit about music 
around here. Khamīs said that you all 
perform al-rūgh in the early dusk?” Al-rūgh 
is a genre of instrumental reed-pipe music 
accompanied by drumming and some sung 
poetry. The word rūgh refers to both the 
genre and the reed-pipe, which is shaped and 
played like the more common mijwiz. I have 
never encountered any source that discusses 
al-rūgh and so it may be a genre that is 
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mostly performed by shawāwī (seminomadic 
herders) performers, whose music is largely 
undocumented in Western scholarship. 
The area around ’Izkī is, however, home to 
many rare and undocumented instruments, 
including a kind of gourd resonator 
monochord, a large family of African-derived 
idiophones, and so on.
“Al-rūgh,” his brother chuckled, “that’s 
the horn-pipe of Satan [mizmār al-shayṭān],1 
that al-rūgh. The only thing worse is the zār. 
Did you hear about the zār?” The zār is a 
common name for a genre of healing music 
mostly performed by and for women: as it 
deals with metahumans like jinn, among 
other supernatural beings, it is roundly 
condemned by Islamic scholars.2 
“Zār? You want to see a zār, doctor?” 
Khamīs perked up. “Mizmār al-shayṭān, ha! 
I hold a zār here every night. Zār and mizmār, 
all night.” Of course, Khamīs did not hold a 
performance of zār or rūgh every night, but 
he was voicing an opinion contrary to his 
brother’s take on the Islamic status of things 
called music. Rather than acquiescing to the 
putative illicit nature of some practices, as 
Ḥamad would later do, Khamīs pushed back 
against that discourse, claiming to embrace 
a profoundly controversial genre of mūsīqā.  
As these anecdotes show, Ibāḍī Omanis 
express a wide range of discursive and 
metadiscursive perspectives on the charge 
of music, from those like Khamīs’s—that 
embrace targeted sonic practices even in the 
face of condemnation—to those that scorn 
them.3 However, before we discuss particular 
Ibāḍī perspectives on the issue of defining 
“music,” we should outline the general stakes 
of the debate over the status of artistically 
engineered sound in Muslim discourse. 
Such a foray bears a long pedigree: as just 
one example, Amnon Shiloah introduces 
the question as an “interminable debate” in 
his Music in the World of Islam.4 “The debate 
elicited views that varied from complete 
negation to full admittance of all musical 
forms and means, even dance,” Shiloah 
writes, adding that “between these two 
extremes we can find all possible nuances.”5 
Oman, as we’ve seen, is no exception. Early 
in my research, when I was not pursuing 
Omanis’ perceptions of the Islamic status 
of musical sounds, I nevertheless recorded a 
wide range of beliefs. These often correlated 
with the social and economic position of the 
speaker: an official in the Omani Center for 
Traditional Music told me that “that debate 
is over, from the Middle Ages the scholars 
agree that music is permitted”; a performer 
of the Sufi-inflected6 mālid genre told me 
that “rhythm [al-‘īqā‘] is a powerful tool 
for religion, and must be used with care”; a 
performer of the razḥa at the Muscat Festival 
brought me a fatwa declaring attendance at 
the Muscat Festival to be avoided if possible 
because it included music (mūsīqā, “especially 
from Bahrain,” he added). 
In this article, I want to offer the 
following two interventions in this much-
discussed area: first, I want to positively 
reassess Lois Ibsen al-Faruqi’s landmark 
1985 article “Music, Musicians, and 
Muslim Law” by engaging with her central 
diagrammatic expression of Qur’ānic 
hierarchy; and second, I want to highlight 
an under-recognized aspect of Muslim 
jurisprudential scholarship with regard 
to a variety of sonic practices: the issue 
of function and practicality. Rather than 
criticizing or attempting to replace al-
Faruqi’s claims, I want to think positively 
alongside her work in order to tease out 
further dimensions of her linear model. 
Adding the value dimension of practicality—
which I explore through recent Ibāḍī 
scholarship—to her linear schematic model 
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(and thereby pluralizing the relational 
network between sonic practices and 
Qur’ānic recitation) both allows a useful 
co-conception7 of Islamic jurisprudential 
scholarship on music and highlights a 
heuristic mode often overlooked in previous 
discussions. Specifically, I want to draw out 
of al-Faruqi’s model a latent Dumontian8 
premise: rather than a linear hierarchy of 
gradual transformation from most similar 
to least similar to Qur’ānic recitation, 
recitation may be best understood as 
“encompassing” other Islamically licit sonic 
forms. Sonic practice might therefore exist—
in anthropologist Joel Robbins’s terms9—
within a plural value scheme, with any 
specific practice tugged toward contrasting 
polarities. In taking up the question of value 
and modes of valuation, I engage the recent 
revival in anthropological studies of value,10 
and specifically the ongoing reevaluation 
of the work of Louis Dumont applied to 
cases outside of the Indian subcontinent.11 
While Dumont’s work has encountered 
serious critique in its applications to 
actually existing social structures and value 
regimes in South Asia,12 certain elements 
of Dumont’s thinking have been usefully 
applied to conceptual schemes as opposed 
to social structure.13 In so engaging, I seek 
not to champion one or another theoretical 
approach, but to evaluate the purchase 
afforded by value-oriented approaches 
in examining a potent and historically 
perduring conceptual hierarchy. 
Starting “As Muslims Do,” Ending Up 
Where We Started
Understanding how differently positioned 
Muslims regard sonic practices requires 
both historical and ethnographic 
engagement. To do this, we should begin, 
in Talal Asad’s terms, “as Muslims do, from 
the context of a discursive tradition that 
includes and relates itself to the founding 
texts of the Qur’an and the Hadith.”14 This 
is precisely al-Faruqi’s initial point in her 
article, published a year before Asad’s 
remarks, in which she urges researchers 
to utilize materials “that a consensus of 
the Muslims themselves consider to be 
authoritative in these matters.”15 The irony, 
of course, is that starting “as Muslims do” 
reveals precisely the core complexity of 
discussing “music” and Islam: that there 
is no obvious universal position. The only 
sūra, or verse, in the entire Qur’ān that 
scholars have argued refers directly to 
“music” is Luqmān 6: “And of those people 
who buy idle talk to lead [others] astray 
from the path of God without knowledge, 
and take it as mockery, they will [face] a 
humiliating punishment.” The central term 
in this sūra, “idle talk,” is a translation of 
al-lahū al-ḥadīth, whose exact translation 
has been subject to many opinions, as we 
shall see. Indeed, this is why Asad promotes 
studying Islam and Islamic practices 
as “discursive traditions.”16 Practices are 
constituted within discourses that relate to 
past, present, and future, and are Islamic 
insofar as they are practices that induct 
persons as Muslims. An Islamic practice 
so constituted, for Asad, is authorized as 
orthodoxy. “Wherever Muslims have power 
to regulate, uphold, require or adjust correct 
practices,” Asad claims, “and to condemn, 
exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect 
ones, there is the domain of orthodoxy,” 
which is “crucial to all Islamic traditions.”17 
For our discussion here, we should recognize 
that the “interminable debate” over the 
legal status of any one sonic practice is 
precisely the kind of discursive tradition to 
which Asad is drawing attention. However, 
despite Asad’s claim of the constant push for 
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orthodoxy (and orthopraxy), the status of 
certain practices remains doggedly murky.
This situation is noted by historian 
Shahab Ahmed when he criticizes Asad’s 
notion of Islam as a tradition in What Is 
Islam? Troubled by Asad’s identification 
of the push to orthodoxy as the core 
of Islamic practices, Ahmed concludes 
that it is incorrect “to put forward a 
schema where the definitive purpose 
of the discursive tradition/Islam is the 
production of orthodoxy.”18 Ahmed 
instead argues that, at least within what he 
terms the “Balkans-to-Bengal complex,” a 
“temporal-geographical entity” stretching 
from Sarajevo to Dhaka, a huge range of 
discursive practices have flourished—
“Avicennan philosophy, Akbarian Sufism, 
Suhrawardīan Illuminationism, Ḥāfiẓian 
poetics, figural painting and wine-
drinking”—practices that never strive for 
orthodoxy, embrace complexity, but are 
nevertheless “at the very center of the 
discursive tradition” and hence Islam.19 
One of Ahmed’s strongest statements of 
this fact comes from analyzing the musical 
life of Amīr Khusraw, the famed inventor of 
qawwālī (650–725/1253–1325). Noting 
that music is rarely considered “Islamic,” 
he shows that despite this, “in the self-
statement of Muslims, we find that music 
is made meaningful precisely in . . . Islamic 
terms.”20 Ahmed claims that Khusraw’s 
heterodox and anti-authoritarian “couplets 
on music constitute and make normative 
statements that are at once philosophy, 
Sufism, theology, Qur’ānic exegesis and 
law” and hence take part in the “discursive 
tradition” as much as any scholars seeking 
orthodoxy. What Ahmed articulates is 
the plurality of values that might animate 
Islamic practice in one or another of the 
varied contexts in which Muslims have 
constituted themselves as Muslims: poetry 
exegesis, esoterica, musical rapture, and so 
on. Orthodoxy hangs less as a North Star 
and more as point in a complex constellation.
In Oman and among Ibāḍīs, what is 
interesting about the outcome of this 
debate over the status of certain sonic 
practices is not that Muslims do not seek 
orthodoxy and orthopraxy, since they 
decidedly do. Rather, the avowedly Islamic 
conclusions of the debate admit the 
performance of controversial practices—
the ‘āzī and the razḥa—for controversial 
reasons. In ‘āzī, a lead singer sing-recites a 
formal, monorhymed ode on a given topic, 
most often praising local leaders, while a 
choral group sings antiphonal responses 
and plays drum rolls. The razḥa, on the 
other hand, is a circle dance that involves 
lines of dancers trading lines of sung 
poetry, coordinated by a pair of drums. 
These practices are linked to each other in 
that they are both performed by the same 
group of men but are also conceptually 
associated with warfare. Poems sung in 
each often deal with belligerence, violence, 
bravery, and the glories of combat, inciting 
the participants to courage in arms. Neither, 
as I have noted, is considered “mūsīqā,” 
but then neither is considered wholly 
Islamically licit. Here, Ibāḍī charges of 
“music” are not simply a matter of applying 
or constructing an orthodoxy under which 
everything is either accepted or not, as 
Asad would have it; nor do legal scholars 
merely privilege the capacity of practices 
to “have meaning” for Muslims over and 
above the desires of centralized power, as 
would Ahmed. Instead, we can see a strong 
pragmatic thread, attending closely to 
context and wary of the ramifications of 
overzealous condemnation. Rather than 
trying to establish an Ibāḍī “doctrine” on 
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sonic practices, we can use Ibāḍī writings 
and fatwas to trace their shifting role in 
the lives of Omani Muslims. As we shall 
see, historically, the razḥah and the ‘āzī 
seem to have been tolerated because 
they were technologies of warfare—and 
insofar as they supported war, they were 
deeply connected to statecraft, elites, and 
leadership. They are tolerated merely 
because they are practical: they serve some 
explicit, useful purpose for Ibāḍīs. 
Music and Muslim Law, Redux; or, 
A Chain of Beings of Decreasing Dignity
Al-Faruqi’s classic investigation of the status 
of music in Islam (writ broadly) presents 
a hierarchy of “sound art expressions” 
Figure 1. The Qur’ānic hierarchy. A linear vertical representation of the relative 
legal ranking of various sound-art expressions by Muslim legal scholars. Qur’ānic 
recitation occupies the highest value position, and all others are related by way of 
decreasing Islamic legitimacy. Other value orderings can be read into sections of the 
diagram, such as the role of words or the voice, the inculcation of emotional states, 
or the presence of musical instruments. Adapted from al-Faruqi 1985, 8.
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(handasah al-ṣawt) that are arranged in 
relation to two poles whose statuses are 
clear.21 I reproduce this linear model in 
Figure 1. At the top of the hierarchy lies 
the most legitimate form of handasah al-
ṣawt: Qur’ānic recitation (qirā’a), and at 
the bottom is “sensuous music associated 
with unacceptable contexts.”22 Virtually all 
Islamic scholars are in agreement on the 
position of these two forms. In al-Faruqi’s 
hierarchy, she places Qur’ānic recitation 
and religious chants that are a “duty to 
believers” (adhān, tahlīl/ṭalbiyyah, etc.) 
above poems with noble themes and a 
variety of occasional musics. Conceptually 
“below” these are the controversial genres of 
art song, improvisations, non-Islamic, and 
sensuous music.
Al-Faruqi concludes that the intention 
of the hierarchy was not to “destroy all 
sound-art,” but rather to submit musical 
pleasure to higher ethical standards.23 She 
argues that “a number of interrelated aspects 
seem to have been involved in determining 
the implicit hierarchy of sound-art that is 
described here.”24 However, the four aspects 
she picks out (conformity with Qur’ānic 
chant; conformity with the “aesthetic 
demands of the culture”; community 
acceptance or esteem; and “conformance in 
sound-art to the moral demands of Islam”) 
do not seem to imply a unidirectional—or 
monist, following Robbins—organizational 
hierarchy.25 Al-Faruqi posits that formal 
similarity to Qur’ānic recitation is the 
metric by which sonic practices are aligned: 
those like Qur’ānic chant are next in line 
below it, those that are less similar further 
away, and so on. One reason this valuation 
by similarity works is that the forms and 
stylistic features of Qur’ānic recitation are 
often strategically employed by capable 
performers, and astute listeners evaluate 
such employments with considerable 
nuance. Virginia Danielson points to the 
repertory of Umm Kulthum as one example 
of an explicit link between Qur’ānic 
recitation and Arabic song. Specific features 
like nasalization, hoarseness or baḥḥaḥ, 
and a full and deliberate pronunciation 
of emphatic, velar, and uvular consonants 
were all used by Umm Kulthum in order 
to evoke recitation in her performances of 
poetic texts.26 However, while this seems to 
hold for those sonic practices that al-Faruqi 
sees as closely related to the Qur’ān as well 
as serious metered song, where does this 
leave lullabies, works songs, and military 
parades? 
Here, I want to turn to a useful tool 
of structural analysis that has seen some 
recent rehabilitative theoretical work: 
Louis Dumont’s notion of hierarchy, 
and specifically that of “hierarchical 
opposition.”27 Hierarchical opposition 
refers to a value relation that is measured 
between “a set or whole and an element 
of that set or whole.”28 This nesting of 
values is regarded as revealing “levels” of 
value, heuristically described as “higher” or 
“lower.” The crucial feature of hierarchical 
opposition is that relatively higher values 
encompass relatively lower values, in this 
sense meaning that higher values include 
as part of their value those lower ones as 
well (as in the Euler diagram in Figure 2). 
Lower values are recognized as supporting 
higher values, as deriving their value 
from just a part or parts of higher values. 
Nevertheless, since they offer a value 
dimension that is distinct from a higher 
one, they are considered “contradictory.”29 
We can operationalize this in our discussion 
of the Qur’ānic hierarchy by pointing out 
that Qur’ānic  recitation does not serve as 
a performative model for other Islamically 


















Figure 2: Dominance hierarchy. A depiction of the encompassing and encompassed values 










Figure 2: Dominance hierarchy. A depiction of the 
encompassing and encompassed values within any 
Dumontian hierarchy, here the Qur’ānic hierarchy. 
Adapted from Dumont by way of Leonhard Euler.
licit genres to mimic; rather, it provides a 
cardinal value to whic  they are ultim t ly 
ordinated, subordinated, and coordinated.30 
The question of whether Qur’ānic 
recitation acts as a monist “supervalue” 
that encompasses all others can be 
approached by way of Joel Robbins’s 
pluralist conception of Dumont’s notion of 
hierarchy.31 Dumont writes that hierarchy 
is not “a great chain of beings of decreasing 
dignity,” which Robbins interprets as 
Dumont’s recognition of the potential 
plurality of values exposed in differing 
contextual relations.32 Robbins continues 
by pointing out that “chains in which 
successive elements are distinguished by 
decreasing amounts of a single valued 
feature are clearly organized by a single 
value” and hence fail to regard other, 
concurrent, crosscutting plural values that 
may spring into importance within various 
concrete contexts.33 Such values may be 
quite diverse and contextually specific. 
As Jonathan Glasser has recently argued, 
“[Dumontian] hierarchy presupposes a 
segmentation of values: social worlds 
are suffused by diverse and extendable 
rankings that can come into complex, 
overlapping, and intertwined relation with 
one another.”34 Musicians may be regularly 
subordinated in wider society and occupy 
rather low-status positions even though the 
skills they possess may make them—under 
certain conditions—immensely valuable 
to power, say, for purposes of propaganda, 
playing dance music, enlivening feasts 
and festivals, accompanying parades, and 
so on. While the “cardinal value” of any 
social structure may be something like 
patrilineal descent from the Prophet, on 
certain occasions, this higher value makes 
room for musicians and other skilled 
laborers to be contextually highly valued. 
The value attributed to any one practice 
in the Qur’ānic hierarchy that al-Faruqi 
tracks may or may not be fully realized by 
the dimension of similarity. I follow Naomi 
Haynes and Justin Hickel in concluding that 
what is most useful in tracking hierarchical 
arrangements is the “way that they reveal 
particular ideological arrangements, that is, 
topographies of value.”35 
If the perfection of Qur’ānic recitation 
for Muslims is not approximated in 
Ottoman mehter military marches, nor yet 
in Omani ‘āzī or razḥa, or lullabies or work 
songs or poetry with noble themes for that 
matter—then what makes these practices 
valuable, that is, licit, is that they are not 
made to oppose the higher value of recitation, 
but are, in fact, held to be subordinate to 
and supportive of it. The overriding value of 
the recitation of the Qur’ān and the values 
to which that practice points for listeners 
“makes room,” in some sense, for other 
practices that might be evaluated along 
different but supervened value dimensions. 
Nested levels of “reverse supervenience” 
are the very stuff of Dumontian hierarchy. 
In other words, lower levels of difference 
are determined and shaped by—and must 
ultimately be cashed out in terms defined 
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by—higher levels. Rather than higher levels 
of value relying on lower ones for coherence, 
lower ones rely on higher ones. Practitioners 
can perform and value lower-level sonic 
practices in circumscribed contexts and 
otherwise regard them as safely inferior to 
or dependent on the recitation of the Qur’ān.
Figure 3 is a diagram that I propose 
as a co-conception with al-Faruqi’s: here, 
rather than expressing one hierarchical 
spectrum, I choose to break apart the model 
into independent practices in order to track 
value segmentation. The upper purple 
field represents the “highest value level” of 
recitation. The grey circles carved out of that 
field are two potential contradicting lower 
values—similarity and practicality. Rather 






Figure 3. Relational-hierarchical model of the Qur’ānic hierarchy. In this model, the linear descending order 
is broken into various “lower”-value dimensions, which I have provisionally named similarity, practicality, 
corruptability, and apostasy. I only explore the value dimension of practicality here. Specifically, what this model 
displays is that each practice is not fitted somewhere along a monist continuum of similarity, but is evaluated against 
Qur’ānic recitation as a “higher” or encompassing value. The purple field represents the capacity of Qur’ānic chant 
to define the total value landscape of any non-mūsīqā practice and the grey circles represent the delimited domains 
of lesser values that operate within that space. The lower diagram, or mūsīqā section, is provisional—a polar model 
of the Qur’ānic hierarchy would necessarily include recitation’s obverse, that is, sensuous music. The dotted lines 
represent the potential of mūsīqā practices to be encompassed not by recitation, but by sensuous music instead.
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a monist descending scheme, pluralizing the 
model allows us to more fully explore the 
exceptions and legal specificities that allow 
practical genres to flourish as legitimate 
ones despite sharing little in common with 
other licit genres. Nevertheless, everything 
here is ultimately “reduced” to the positions 
they occupy within al-Faruqi’s model. 
Taking apart the linear model allows us to 
track relations between the various entities 
as encompassed by Qur’ānic recitation, or, 
the obverse, as potentially encompassed by 
sensuous music. In this model, sensuous 
music operates not so much as a category 
drained of all the elements of Qur’ānic 
recitation, but as a polar opposite to it, as 
a potential encompassing value to which 
some practices may be oriented instead. 
While I won’t dwell on this potential here, 
the threat of sensuous music’s capacity to 
encompass certain genres of undecided 
legality may help explain their medial 
position in al-Faruqi’s diagram. Rather than 
a unidirectional decline in value, we have a 
contestation. What this model exposes, I 
think, is that similarity is one value vector 
amongst many by which Omani Ibāḍī 
Muslims implicitly and explicitly experience 
this value hierarchy. Hence, similarity to 
recitation may be operant in some cases 
as a mode by which sonic practices are 
encompassed within the Qur’ānic hierarchy, 
but it may coexist alongside many others.
The relational-hierarchical model thus 
exposes the “level” at which other values 
may operate within the entire hierarchy. In 
this case, I pick out but one, practicality, 
and show how it more parsimoniously 
explains the licit nature of what al-Faruqi 
describes as “occupational music,” “life cycle 
music,” and—my special focus in the next 
section—“military music.” Similarity is the 
wrong value to explain these cases, but in 
a linear model this subtlety is subsumed to 
explanation via a higher value. Practicality 
may never be important at higher levels of 
valuation, but it does come into play—and 
quite specifically in the case of the ‘āzī and 
the razḥa in Oman. Now we shall turn to 
the evidence that points to practicality as a 
“lower value” in the Qur’ānic hierarchy of 
sonic practices.
“Devotion Is a Wide Door”: Islam, Ibāḍī 
Pragmatism, and the “Problem” of 
Useful Music
In this section, I want to first draw out 
the seriousness with which Ibāḍī scholars 
condemn practices called “music” in 
order to contextualize the importance of 
embracing practicality as a value in genres 
that bear no resemblance to Qur’ānic 
recitation—specifically, sounds organized 
for war. When we look at Ibāḍī scholars’ 
judgments pertaining to musical sound, 
one contemporary scholar’s work stands 
out: Khālid bin ‘Īsā bin Ṣāliḥ al-Sulaymānī’s 
Al-ghinā’ wa al-ma‘āzif f ī al-mayzān: qirā’a 
f ī al-aḥkām al-fiqhiyya al-mut‘aliqa bi al-
ghinā’ wa al-ma‘āzif wa ḥukumhumā f ī al-
islām (Singing and Musical Instruments 
in the Balance: A Study on Jurisprudential 
Judgments Pertaining to Singing and 
Musical Instruments and Their Judgment 
in Islam).36 Al-Sulaymānī gives an overview 
of the debate surrounding singing and 
musical instruments first by looking at the 
Qur’ān and the “pure sunna” (Ibāḍīs regard 
only a small selection of ḥadīth-s as “pure”), 
then by taking up a philological approach 
to the definition of the key terms “singing” 
(al-ghinā’) and “the playing of musical 
instruments” (al-ma‘āzif). These two 
terms are often used in conjunction with 
each other in the Islamic jurisprudence 
on music, referring at least in general to 
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“singing” and “musical instruments and the 
playing of musical instruments.”
Al-ghinā’ and al-ma‘āzif
Al-Sulaymānī writes that “singing” (al-ghinā’)
is a “polluted word” (kalima mulawwitha) 
due to its association with “those that draw 
from singing a craft and profession; and 
those that bring to it musical instruments 
that move/agitate the spirit, that arouse 
passionate love and obscenity.”37 It is for 
this reason that “those with common sense 
are on their guard against using the word 
‘singing’ (al-ghinā’) and avoid it, and they 
replace it with other words such as the word 
inshād.”38 Such a shift in vocabulary does not 
change the status of music that is already 
“polluted.” “If we come to the general 
meaning of the word al-ghinā’ among the 
Arabs,” al-Sulaymānī continues, it has come 
to refer only to “al-ghinā’ al-mājin (‘immoral 
singing’).” 39 Al-Sulaymānī concludes by 
firmly distinguishing between al-ghinā’ al-
mubāḥ and al-ghinā’ al-muḥarram. Mubāḥ 
(permissible) in Islamic jurisprudence means 
something that is permitted but for which 
there is neither reward nor punishment: 
something toward which one ought to 
cultivate indifference. Al-ghinā’ al-mubāḥ for 
al-Sulaymānī “is chaste, modest, respectable, 
authentic singing, free from the traces of 
indecency and which is not accompanied 
by musical instruments and the forbidden 
ṭarab. This type is now classified under the 
name inshād.”40 These include the categories 
that we have modeled as licit: lullabies, work 
songs, military marches, and so on. As for 
al-ghinā’ al-muḥarram, al-Sulaymānī quotes 
Māliki scholar Abū ‘Abdullah al-Qurṭabī 
(610–671/1214–1273): 
It is immoral singing . . .[as al-Qurṭabī 
said] it is “singing which agitates 
the spirits and that arouses them to 
passionate love, amorous poetry and 
obscenity . . . which moves the still and 
reveals the hidden . . . this is that type 
of singing if it has poetry that celebrates 
[women in verse] by mentioning women 
and descriptions of their beauties, and 
mentioning wine and other forbidden 
things upon which there is no difference 
[of opinion among scholars] in their 
being forbidden . . . As for what the Sufis 
have created these days it is from an 
addiction to listening to the sung [samā‘ 
al-mughannī] and the instruments of 
ṭarab.”41
As we saw above, at some point the last 
definition, that is, singing being associated 
with immorality, became the most commonly 
used definition of al-ghinā’. Other types 
of singing used to be referred to as ghinā’, 
including the Islamically licit genres of 
wedding/life-cycle and occupational music. 
Over time, however, for many Islamic 
scholars, the word ghinā’ itself has come to 
represent all that is negative in vocal music. 
Al-ma‘azif, in a similar process, has 
come to refer to all musical instruments 
and the playing of them. Early definitions, 
such as those compiled by Ibn Manẓūr (d. 
711/1312), indicate that al-ma‘āzif referred 
only to the playing of instruments, not the 
instruments themselves, equating it with 
malāhī, or “entertainment.” Later scholars 
amended the meaning of al-ma‘āzif to 
include musical instruments as objects.42
Ibāḍī Pragmatism: Condemnation and 
Conciliation 
When al-Sulaymānī shifts his focus to 
presenting the perspectives of Ibāḍī 
perspectives on music, he is unequivocal: 
The reader of the books of Ibāḍī scholars 
that treat the question of singing 
and musical instruments and what is 
related to them (in the judgment of 
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jurisprudential scholars) finds that 
Ibāḍism is among the harshest of all 
the Islamic schools in condemning 
singing and its instruments. There is no 
difference among Ibāḍī scholars and their 
rulings, neither in the past nor in the 
present, on the question of forbidding 
singing and musical instruments. Rather, 
their statements on the two are the most 
ruthless of all statements, and they 
consider the two among the greatest sins 
and most reprehensible actions.43 
Such is the position espoused by Muḥammad 
bin ’Ibrāhīm al-Kindī, cited above: “listening 
to entertainment is disobedient, sitting 
among it is sinfulness, and working in it is 
apostasy (of ungratefulness towards God’s 
blessings, kufr al-nu‘ama).”44 Many Ibāḍī 
scholars have interpreted this kind of harsh 
judgment as permitting the destruction of 
instruments as a means of defense against 
them. The breaking of instruments is a 
common behavior cultivated in “enjoining 
the right and forbidding the wrong.” Such 
a statement is recorded by the eleventh-/
seventeenth-century Ibāḍī scholar Shaykh 
Muḥammad bin ‘Abdullah bin Jum‘a bin 
‘Abīdān al-Nizwī:
As for the dahra/daïre and the mizmār-s 
and all the instruments of entertainment, 
it is permitted for you to break them if 
you are able, if they are used or not. As 
for the dahra/daïre, the āṣnāj [cymbals] 
and zamārāt, they are to be broken 
wherever found, used or not. As for the 
reed instrument [qaṣba], as it has been 
said: “when it is used and there is singing 
with it” . . . as for the duff-s, if they are 
used outside of the month of marriage, 
then they are to be broken.45 
Another instrument mentioned by the Ibāḍīs, 
more familiar in Central Asia, is the ṭunbūr. 
Interestingly, Mūsā bin Ābī Jābir al-Manḥī 
(of Manaḥ, d. 181/797) writes that one 
has “permission to leave it unbroken ‘if it 
was without adornment’ [’idha kān li-ghayr 
zayna], [though] if the value of the ṭunbūr 
seemed high, then most scholars permitted 
breaking it ‘even if it was of great value.’”46 
Ibāḍīs were careful to condemn not 
just their own music, but that of Africans, 
British subjects, and Indians as well.47 
British imperial officers stationed in Muscat 
noted in 1869 that the influence of Sa‘īd 
bin Khalfān al-Khalīlī, an Ibāḍī scholar, 
had reached such a level that he outlawed 
the weekly music sessions of the Siddi-s (a 
population derived from enslaved Africans) 
in the capital.48 Similarly, the British political 
agent in Muscat had to intervene when Ibāḍī 
leaders requested that he prevent his Indian 
subjects from 
beating drums or playing musical 
instruments. Disbrowe [the political 
agent in Muscat] refused to heed the 
request. Instead, he replied that if these 
activities were restricted [to] hours when 
it is unreasonable or caused disturbance, 
then an understanding could be reached 
between the two sides. [Imam] ‘Azzān 
in his reply stated that music was to be 
banned at all times and no concession 
would be made to British subjects.49
‘Azzān’s time as imam was predicated on his 
opposition to imperial ingresses in Oman 
and his call to reassert the religious basis of 
the Imamate.
The essential statement on music for 
our purposes, however, is a qaṣīda written 
by the famed Imam ‘Abdullah bin Ḥumayd 
“Nūr al-Dīn” al-Sālimī (1286–1332/1869–
1914) in the Jawhār al-Niẓām f ī ‘ilmī al-
’adyān wa-l-aḥkām (The Jewel of Order in 
the Science of Religions and Judgments), a 
collection of poems and prose sections that 
gather and expound on Ibāḍī Islamic themes. 
Nūr al-Dīn was one of the most prolific and 
popular scholars of the Ibāḍī renaissance of 
the late nineteenth century, and his poems 
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are widely read, bought, memorized, and 
interpreted today—virtually any library or 
bookstore in Oman contains his work. In 
the section entitled “Book of the Order of 
the World,” in the subsection “Enjoining the 
Right and Forbidding the Wrong,” he writes 
the following lines:
And the instruments of entertainment 
that have no use
Outside of themselves are to be 
broken whenever they are found,
In all of their types that exist,
Because in this there is no benefit.
Bin Maḥbūb told us about his compatriot;
That he played a drum with no mind 
to it.
And in their telling, he [Bin Maḥbūb] 
rent the leather [of the drumheads]
And that is incumbent upon any of 
the proper [Muslims].
And they are not permitted to play the 
drum
For entertainment—but for two “just 
meanings”:
And that is the terrorization of enemies,
And as a response to the distant cries 
[of communication],
And as a call to the prayers of the festival 
[al-‘īd]
Or to a serious and purposeful 
meeting between them [Muslims].50 
Nūr al-Dīn once again demonstrates the 
harsh Ibāḍī injunction to destroy musical 
instruments. What this passage shows 
most clearly, however, is the pragmatic 
Ibāḍī interest in function and uselessness. 
The poet’s main criticism of music and 
musical instruments in this passage is that 
the instruments of entertainment are to 
be broken “because in [them] there is no 
benefit” and they “have no use outside of 
themselves.” Al-Sulaymānī adds that musical 
instruments are “not [the kind of things] 
that are benefited from.”51 When the “two 
‘just meanings’” for using instruments are 
provided, they are clearly phrased in terms 
of function: insofar as drums are useful 
in times of war (to terrorize enemies and 
coordinate soldiers) and peace (to gather 
the Muslims to festival and consultation), 
they are permitted. This is a clear expression 
of what al-Faruqi presented as the hierarchy 
of handasa al-ṣawt, but the justification of it 
is presented in terms not of the practice’s 
similarity to the recitation of the Qur’ān, 
but of its benefit to believers in other ways.
The current grand muftī of the Sultanate 
of Oman, Aḥmad bin Ḥamad al-Khalīlī, 
has issued several fatwas about music 
and echoes his predecessors very closely. 
Condemnation should be the general stance, 
but bets are hedged. The general Ibāḍī 
interpretation of music contends that the 
“al-lahū al-ḥadīth” mentioned in Luqmān 6 
refers to music, musical instruments, the 
purchase or renting of music, and nearly 
everything else related to it. In an undated 
fatwa issued by the muftī, he summarizes 
the Ibāḍī position:
Al-lahū is impermissible [yaḥram al-
lahū] when it pulls to it corruption 
and emits iniquity. Its impermissibility 
is evidenced by the true speech of the 
Most High: “And of those people who 
buy idle talk to lead [others] astray from 
the path of God without knowledge” 
[Luqmān 6]. Al-lahū al-ḥadīth in this 
verse is “singing,” as narrated by the 
learned interpreter and translator of 
the Qur’ān Ibn ‘Abbās—God’s mercy 
upon him. Thus it was told about the 
Prophet—may God send prayers and 
peace—through the telling of twelve 
of his followers, of [his] prohibition of 
singing and playing and instruments 
[al-ghinā’ wa-l-‘azif wa-l-zamr]. Despite 
this, scholars have permitted, in the 
case of war, what inspires ḥamās [vigor, 
enthusiasm] in the believers and 
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strengthens their resolves. However, 
war songs [inshād-s] that carry ḥamās 
are conditional provided they do not 
come at the expense of religious duties, 
such as impeding the duty to remember 
God and the duty of prayer; surely, God 
knows best.52
Here we have a good example of the capacity 
of Qur’ānic recitation (and the values 
within which it is situated) to encompass 
a contradicting lower value: war songs are 
tolerated “provided they do not come at the 
expense of religious duties.” Once again, 
function outweighs the doctrinal slash-
and-burn prohibition of music. Music 
is, in fact, too useful to ban completely. 
Practicality is valued at one level but cannot 
overwhelm the cardinal value of the Qur’ān 
and Islamic duty. In my discussions of this 
with another religious scholar, he explained 
to me that non-Muslims often think that 
Muslims ban alcohol and music without 
exception: “In fact,” he pointed out, “alcohol 
and music are common. Why? Because you 
need alcohol for cleaning, chemistry, for 
useful things [ashiyā’ muf īda] like perfume. 
It is the same with music. It is not ḥarām 
without exception—if it is useful and 
beneficial to the Muslim, he must use and 
benefit from it.” 
The definition of permitted sonic art for 
Ibāḍīs is also quite wide—as al-Faruqi notes, 
it is only that music which is most strongly 
associated with immoral settings that is 
uniformly denounced. In a 2005 fatwa, 
the muftī also commented on a variety of 
inshād-s that were sent to him. The letter 
and response read:53
July 2005 / Jumādā al-thānī 1426 Fatwa
In the name of God, the merciful, the 
compassionate. His Eminence the Shaykh 
/ ’Āḥmad bin Ḥamad al-Khalīlī the 
Venerable Grand Muftī of the Sultanate:
Peace be upon you, and God’s blessings 
and mercy,
The included attachment with the 
letter is a group of inshād-s that include 
various vocal expressions. Since the 
controversy among people has increased 
around [music’s] judgment according 
to the Sharia, we submit it to your 
Eminence, seeking from you the blessing 
of notifying us as to its status.
The attachment is ordered as follows:
1. Al-duff?
2. Western music/rhythm? [al-‘īqā’ al-
gharbī]
3. Sea music with or without interlocking 
clapping?
4. Invigorating military music?
5. Melismata [Āhāt]—by a natural 
human voice?
6. Melismata by sampler (a human voice 
entered into a computer, then used in 
performance)?
7. Autotune (a human voice entered into 
a computer and purified to become sharp, 
free from melodic impurities)?
8. Vocal alternatives (a human voice 
entered into a computer which then 
undergoes editing until it becomes like 
another voice)?
9. Bass [al-bayz] (a rough voice 
accompanying music/rhythm either 
human or nonhuman)?
The answer: It is well known that 
devotion is a wide door. So he who 
is prudent leaves [unmolested] the 
nonprohibited—that is most safe and 
forthright. As for the judgment, I do 
not find in what has been presented 
in these expressions something that 
is forbidden except for Western 
music, insofar as it is in imitation 
of nonbelievers, and sea music with 
interlocking clapping due to the 
clapping. Surely God knows best.54
In this letter, values that we might imagine 
to be central (such as the unmodulated 
human voice) are not regarded as interesting, 
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whereas “Western music/rhythm” remains 
as clearly condemned, as al-Faruqi’s diagram 
makes clear.  
Nevertheless, the contemporary Omani 
state has embraced certain aspects of 
“Western music,” establishing highland 
bagpipe regiments in the army, multiple 
orchestras, compulsory music education 
in primary classrooms, and, most recently, 
opening the Royal Opera House in 2011. 
Ethnomusicologists Anne Rasmussen and 
Majid al-Harthy have documented the 
Omani state’s huge investment in music 
and the arts more generally.55 This official 
support of both music and its official Ibāḍī 
condemnation has largely been understood 
as reflecting the personality of the former 
sultan, who is said to love European music. 
The Opera House has witnessed a number 
of minor protests over the years for “un-
Islamic” activities, such as an event in 2013 
in which verses of the Qur’ān were read 
or sung during a live jazz performance.56 
At the same time, the government has 
long patronized the dozens of traditional 
performance groups that specialize in a 
variety of local arts, whose status is at the 
very least questionable (such as the “sea 
music” in the letter above).
Is “Music” Useful or Useless?
What emerges from the preceding discussion 
most clearly is (1) that proscriptions on 
individual sonic practices made by Ibāḍīs 
are very fine-grained, and (2) that a crucial 
deciding factor is whether or not the practice 
or instrument serves a discrete and necessary 
social function. Hence, while musical 
instruments are broadly impermissible, 
commonly held exceptions exist to preserve 
what is useful and beneficial. Similarly, 
practices that are considered to have no use 
or benefit are prohibited. One example of 
this kind of thinking is given by al-Nabahānī 
when he writes that the large qaṣba (“reed,” 
flute) was “beneficial in remembering the 
hereafter (or death in another reading). It 
was reported about al-Wuḍāḥ bin ‘Aqaba 
[fl. 237/851] that his son Ziyād saw him 
listening to the sound of the large qaṣba 
while crying.”57
This practical mode of thinking in 
religious matters was reported by Mandana 
Limbert in her ethnographic research 
on sociality in Bahlā’ as well.58 However, 
Limbert notes the reverse: older Bahlawis 
considered social visiting to be an aspect of 
pious living, while “being social, younger 
Bahlawis argued, was a distraction from the 
constant remembering of God” and therefore 
ought to be condemned.59 “Thus,” Limbert 
continues, “rather than considering this 
sociality to be ‘proper’ (that is, religiously 
sanctioned), younger Bahlawis argued that 
it was useless (ghayr nafa’a), a waste of time, 
and thus a sin.”60 Rather than the usefulness 
of a practice determining its acceptability, 
it is the uselessness of an action (within a 
certain discourse) that condemns it. Despite 
protestations that visiting might, in fact, 
be a kind of work (shughl), its frivolity is 
enough to make it sinful. Limbert notes 
that philosopher Oliver Leaman traces this 
tendency of equating “uselessness” with 
sin back to the third-/tenth-eleventh-
century Islamic jurist ‘Abd al-Jabbar, who 
first presented the uselessness of an action 
as “sufficient condition of its evilness,” 
whatever the consequences.61 If, as ‘Abd al-
Jabbar claims, “everything has value because 
there is a purpose behind its existence,” then 
“anything which is not in accordance with 
this purpose must be evil. The performance 
of a useless action must be objectionable 
on such a view, since it involves acting as 
though there were no all-encompassing 
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purpose at work in creation.”62 Despite the 
high-mindedness of this claim, for Omanis 
the concept of uselessness is a very everyday 
one. A common saying among Omanis when 
evaluating something is to say “mā yaṣlaḥ,” 
which means both “it’s not proper” and “it’s 
not usable, not practicable,” or the opposite, 
“yaṣlaḥ,” meaning “it is fitting, serviceable, 
or useful.” The Omani proverb gald al-fi’r 
mā yaṣlaḥ l-al-raḥmānī (literally, “A mouse’s 
hide isn’t useful/enough to skin a raḥmānī 
drum”) is used to refer to meager attempts 
to solve a big problem. Encouragements 
to drink more water, juice, or coffee, to eat 
more, or to use incense are accompanied by 
the phrase “it will benefit you” (yistaf īdak). 
After many interviews and performances, 
I was asked, “Did you benefit from it?” 
(tistaf īd minnu?). Discussing the moral 
dangers of coffee and coffee consumption in 
Bahlā’, Limbert cites a jurisprudential qaṣīda 
poem by the scholar Mājid bin Khamīs al-
‘Abrī (1252–1340/1836/37–1921/22), 
who “simply notes that there is nothing 
wrong with coffee and that its effects are not 
harmful, but rather useful.”63
Legitimating the Drums of War
This circumscribed commitment to 
practicality is what allows the ‘āzī and the 
razḥa to flourish in contemporary Oman. 
“It is noteworthy that the attitudes of the 
[Ibāḍī] jurists are not uniformly hardline,” 
writes Michael Cook, and that “the single 
most prominent motive behind the softer 
views is military.”64 Cook notes that chess 
might be roundly condemned and yet could 
be allowed in the case of military instruction, 
that “male shrieking” was illegitimate as 
“a residue of the [pre-Islamic] Jāhiliyya” 
though it could be legitimate when it 
functioned as a “war-cry intended to rally 
the troops and strike fear into the enemy.”65 
The same Muslim jurist notes that “it may 
then be permitted, though his preference 
would be for the use of the Islamic war-cry 
‘God is greatest!’”66 Even more shocking, 
some Omani imams seemed to have toyed 
with the idea of permitting expressly 
forbidden actions if they occurred during 
war. Once again, while practicality wins 
out at one level—justifying a war-cry—the 
legal scholar nevertheless would prefer not 
to have to make such a diversion to a lower 
level of value. Al-Nabahānī notes the same 
process regarding drums in the Interior: 
“it seems,” he offers, “that drums acquired 
their legitimacy from some Islamic scholars 
due to the effect they had during war and 
in meeting the enemy.”67 Al-Nabahānī 
continues that “Shaykh Khamīs bin Sa‘īd al-
Shaqṣī [ca. 1030s–1090s/1620s–1680s)] 
confirms that [legitimacy] when he said:…
‘In our days, the drum is not considered 
shameful [lā yistaqbaḥ al-ṭabl] especially 
if it was a time of war, in a parade at the 
[military?] camps, and perhaps as a sign or 
notice of that.”68 Al-Shaqṣī concludes that 
“each time period and people has its own 
legal judgment,” and al-Nabahānī astutely 
notes that this is perhaps written with a 
sense of resignation. Al-Shaqṣī was active 
during a period in which the Imamate was 
struggling to repel the invaders and contain 
internal separatist movements: “a time of 
the wars to unify the nation and throw out 
the occupying Portuguese.”69 Anticolonial 
necessities prompted a vigorous, if qualified, 
acceptance of the drums of war.
While warfare seems to draw even the 
most condemnatory scholars into a more 
pragmatic mode, it is worth pointing out that 
none of the razḥa-s I recorded, participated 
in, or witnessed were related to the actual 
prosecution of war. Instead, razḥa-s were 
generally linked to war by way of their 
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production of ḥamās, a heightened state of 
vigor, enthusiasm, and élan associated with 
fighting or conflict. Inducing ḥamās, then, 
was the practical function of the razḥa, which, 
in turn, was linked to warfare. Ḥamās is a 
complex phenomenon with considerable 
historical precedent that I cannot engage 
here. Nevertheless, this juncture is where we 
can witness the controversial slippages that 
manifest among the complicated and nested 
legal logics cum valuations that animate the 
acceptance or condemnation of any genre. 
The overlapping relations between war, 
ḥamās, and collective performance are enough 
to support the contingent and controversial 
legal rulings that form the backbone of 
Islamic debates about the value(s) of music. 
Values do not simply emerge and interact 
alone: they are motivated as part of discursive 
projects by situated actors in order to deal 
with the complex exigencies of everyday life. 
Importantly, those motivated discourses help 
shape the topographies of value that Islamic 
scholars navigate. Differently valued “levels” 
of a hierarchy may merge and shift within 
discourses as they accrue the successive 
sedimentations of historical deployment.
If hierarchies imply a “segmentation of 
values,” then one such segmentation may be 
revealed by bracketing certain universally 
licit sonic practices within the Qur’ānic 
hierarchy, such as military marches, and 
revealing the contradictory values by 
which they are rendered acceptable. While 
practicality, function, benefit, or usefulness 
may be relevant for some sonic practices, the 
safeguarding of production (occupational 
music) and reproduction (life-cycle music) 
within Muslim communities may be for 
others. Values may be so nested, and if 
so, the logic of their partibility requires 
investigation. Dumontian hierarchy provides 
one avenue for this. It is worth noting that 
Dumont’s approach may be especially well 
suited for a conceptual hierarchy such as the 
Qur’ānic one precisely because it does not 
appear to map in any straightforward way to 
social structure, as notions such as caste and 
marginalization might.70 The link between 
such conceptual hierarchies and social ones 
seems decidedly more fraught with hazard, 
though careful work here is a useful guide.71
Elaboration of a successful heuristic 
confirms the value of the original 
formulation. While the relational diagram 
of a posited “Qur’ānic hierarchy” that I 
presented here can be read alone, it should 
be read as a complement to and elaboration 
of al-Faruqi’s linear approach. Breaking 
apart al-Faruqi’s continuum allows some 
hidden aspects of the hierarchy to emerge. 
At the same time, some aspects of the linear 
model are obscured, such as the role of the 
word or the presence of musical instruments. 
Nevertheless, by drawing out some of the 
latent “lower-value” dimensions of the 
hierarchy I have pointed to the potential 
for plural value schemes to exist within 
the overwhelming importance of recitation 
by explaining one aspect of one edge case: 
military music. Other cross-cutting values 
may be drawn out in a similar way. Building 
on al-Faruqi’s approach can fruitfully explore 
the historical and ongoing segmentation 
of values within the Islamic tradition of 
debate about music as a project based on 
sophisticated legal logics of precedent and 
analogy, as well as being deeply embedded 
in the everyday. 
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